Response 1/28/2014
For this week, I grappled with the
question whether or not it is theoretically necessary for a reflexive, feminist
methodology to challenge a positivist epistemology. Hesse-Biber and Piatelli
(2007) believe that a reflexive methodology necessarily calls into question the
positivist foundations of scientific inquiry (p. 496). I do not intend to refute
the feminist criticism that “the social world is one fixed reality that is external
to individual consciousness” and the feminist claim that the social world “is socially
constructed, consisting of multiple perspectives and realities” (Hesse-Biber &
Piatelli, p. 497). However, we have to acknowledge that positivist epistemology
does have validation in certain domains and contexts. I am afraid feminist and other
socially-oriented methodologies and epistemologies would refrain from claiming
that anything is socially constructed and has multiple meanings. It seems fair
to say that feminist and social schools of theories and thoughts are valid and
only valid in social contexts. Marshall and Rossman (2011, pp. 45, 46) accept
Ellingson’s (2009) qualitative-quantitative continuum as more appropriate
characterization of the relationship between feminist and positivist approaches
to inquiry, differentiating each as bound by specific methodological and
epistemological traditions. Much as the feminist critique of positivist methodologies
for failing to consider “values and interests” (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, p.
497) is valid, a positivist critique of feminism for falling short of “replication
and neutrality” (p. 496) may be equally persuasive, depending on who is the
speaker and who is the audience. Either of the two claims is supported by the same
principle of multiplicity. To subordinate the voice of the positivist without
offering self-sustained justification may undermine the rigor of feminist
arguments.
Feminists are not doing justice to the
research product in their strategy that foregrounds the process. Process is
rightly problematized. Hesse-Biber and Piatelli (2007) provide a rather
comprehensive summary of the “border work” (Trinh, 1991) that ranges from
positionality, reflexivity, transformation, participation, dialogicality, etc. Halse
and Honey (2005) add with ethical complexity and sensitivity to the list. While
Hesse-Biber and Piatelli make the infallible claim that “[p]rocess is as
important as product” (p. 504), the latter is either silenced or confused with the
overarching purpose of “creat[ing] a more democratic, just society” (p. 508). The
reader is left with an unanswered question: What is that something that can be characterized
as democratic or just? A fairer representation of the multiplicity of
identities of “anorexic” teenage girls (Halse and Honey, 2005) is in itself a
REALITY? In this case, that the process is socially negotiated does not exclude
the possibility of an absolute TRUTH. A feminist research process, in this
example at least, does not necessarily reject a positivist conclusion. We might
as well say a dialogical, interactive relationship also exists between the process
and the product. This understanding may alleviate the unnecessary tension
between a methodological claim on the fluid and reflexive and an epistemological
stance on the fixed and neutral.
Mixed methods, taken generally for
now, might be the solution. However, in my attempt to problematize the distinction
between feminist and positivist methodologies, I suggest that feminists not
isolate a methodology as clear cut from alternative methodologies. Benefits of
this stance are at least twofold: 1) all the valuable considerations, as listed
in Hesse-Biber and Piatelli (2007) might be shared by various domains and
methodologies. Ethical sensitivity, for one, is also central to extremely
positivist fields of inquiry. Physics, space technology, mechanics, are all
inextricably related to general humanity. Even the hardest scientists benefit
from reflections on their positionality in the subject-object binary. 2) The
validity problem. There seems to be no need to play a word game by claiming to modernize
reliability, validity, objectivity, and generalizability into “credibility,
dependability, confirmability, and transferability” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985,
as quoted in Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p. 41). Incorporating ethics in
trustworthiness (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) is barely “worthier” than
gaining the IRB approval or a better opportunity to ensure collaboration from
research participants. What remains to be answered is how ethics contributes to
the research product, as well as the process. Halse & Honey’s (2005) teenage
girls benefited from an ethically sensitive approach to “anorexia.” But the
validity of the study is equally supported by ethical claims about the research
product and the process. I seem to be self-contradictory now, but my point is
that validation resides more in the product than in the process.
How you complicate certain methodology’s criticisms of each other is a necessary issue to consider because, as you allude to, the context of the research might call for one methodology over the other, or a researcher may be more justified based on the realm of inquiry (reality as a form of essential beingness or reality as a socially-constructed interaction―science and social science). However, I would like to focus more on your claim that “validation resides more in the product than in the process”. For me, it’s hard to see methodology or epistemology as creating a binary out of the product and process dynamic. The product always seems dependent on the process. If I go into a research design with a certain epistemological view or methodological stance these will inevitably color my product (which is, in the end, the researcher’s interpretation of the process). Maybe I’m misunderstanding your point about validation, but this is the way I currently understand the relationship. I can see that validation resides in the fact that a study produces results or a proof, yet whether or not we still consider these valid resides with our epistemological/methodological biases, which are often the grounds for disagreement within any discipline.
ReplyDelete
DeleteHi Jason, thank you for your comments. I totally agree: the process and product can never be separated. Just as our biases affect both the process and the product, I wonder if it is also true that oftentimes researchers use the product to justify the process and epistemological/methodological claims. Once feminist work is found to result invariably in "a more democratic, just society” (Hesse-Biber and Piatelli, 2007, p. 508), it seems less of an imperative for feminist researchers to consider issues of validity and reliability in positivist traditions. I appreciate the noble ends of feminist research, but I fear feminists may have a hard time justifying their means. This difficulty may determine whether people outside of the feminist community accept feminism as a perspective or reject it as a methodology. It is a great pleasure and privilege of mine to have this conversation with you. Thanks.